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5ANTHONY BENEZET’S (1713-1784) 
REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC: 
SLAVERY AND SENTIMENTALISM 
IN QUAKER POLITICAL 
REMONSTRANCE
Jon R. KeRshneR
Following the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), many Britons resented the human and financial cost of the war and looked to 
the colonies for partial reimbursement. To this end, Britain passed 
the Stamp Act in 1765, which levied a tax on paper, and beginning in 
1767, the Townsend Act, which taxed imported tea, lead, and other 
products. Colonial printing presses quickly decried these taxes as 
unfair and rebuked the general economic interference in colonial life 
by lawmakers in London. The American Patriots employed a rhetoric 
of virtue, natural rights, and liberty to enflame the popular colonial 
conscience with the conviction that they were being used unjustly.1
In the decade between the passage of the Stamp Act in 1765 and 
the Declaration of Independence in 1776, two causes in colonial 
America worked tirelessly to become popular movements that could 
unite the colonies. One of those causes was the antislavery petitioning 
of Quakers, like Anthony Benezet (1713-1784), who incorporated 
natural rights arguments, biblical interpretation, and traveler’s 
accounts into his transatlantic antislavery advocacy. The other cause 
was the American Patriots’ effort to resist the economic and political 
interference of the British in the colonies and to assert their political 
and social liberty. A key leader of this second cause was the widely 
acclaimed and influential political petitioner, Quaker “fellow traveler,”2 
wealthy lawyer and Founding Father, John Dickinson (1732-1808).
Two political statements, published within a year of each other 
from within the Quaker community, provide a test case for exploring 
the crucial political and theological differences between Quaker 
abolitionists and American Patriots. The first statement is John 
Dickinson’s 1765 The Late Regulations Respecting the British Colonies 
on the Continent of America.3 Dickinson, a Quaker sympathizer and 
the President of Delaware and Pennsylvania under the Articles of 
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Confederation was a slave owner, who manumitted his slaves, but 
indentured many of them to long terms of service.4 Historian Jane 
Calvert describes Dickinson as a “Quakerly Patriot,” and one of the 
most influential writers of the Revolutionary Era.5 Dickinson was not 
a member of a Quaker meeting, and he was not a pacifist, but, he was 
born into a Quaker family, attended meeting regularly, married into a 
prominent Quaker family and translated Quaker ecclesial polity into 
political theory, most notably by advocating for a gradual process of 
constitutional amendment akin to Quaker discernment practices.6 By 
placing Dickinson within the broad Quaker tradition, Calvert shows 
Quakerism of the era to be more theologically and politically diverse 
than scholars have previously acknowledged.
The other political statement is Quaker abolitionist Anthony 
Benezet’s 1766 essay, A Caution and Warning to Great Britain and 
her Colonies in a Short Representation of the Calamitous State of the 
Enslaved Negroes in the British Dominions,7 which was addressed to 
Parliament and called for the intervention of British lawmakers to 
end the slave trade and slavery. Benezet, a leading Philadelphia Yearly 
Meeting reformer, is known as the “Father of Atlantic Abolitionism” 
because of his many antislavery essays and his crucial role in developing 
a transatlantic antislavery network.8 Benezet and other Quaker 
reformers, like John Woolman (1720-1772), are the most famous 
American Quakers of the eighteenth century. However, it is important 
to remember that they and their fellow reformers held a minority view 
of Quakerism for most of the century. Their vision of religious purity 
became more influential through disciplinary proceedings, some of 
which convinced their Quaker peers to reform and some of which 
caused the un-reforming to leave the Society, or forced them to. 
However, with the streamlining of Quaker acceptable behavior and 
theology came also the streamlining of arguments, influence, and 
rhetoric, which, in turn, shaped the nature of acceptable antislavery 
discourse.
This article argues that there were fundamental differences 
between the political remonstrance of Dickinson and Benezet that 
diminished antislavery’s popular appeal, and, so, limited the prospect 
of antislavery ideals becoming a significant plank in the American 
quest for independence. What I am arguing is that in the immediate 
aftermath of the Stamp Act in 1765 and 1766, Quakers, like 
Benezet, articulated a narrow understanding of antislavery protest 
that was unable to become a popular movement because it was so 
closely identified with the reformist strain of eighteenth century 
anthony benezet’s RevolutionaRy RhetoRic • 7
Quaker theology.9 By itself, this contention is not new. However, by 
comparing Dickinson’s and Benezet’s political writings, this paper 
shows that the path of antislavery argumentation pursued by Benezet, 
which focused on sin, judgment, and transnational identity, were 
not the only options for political and popular redress available from 
within the Quaker tradition. In proceeding along the lines that he did, 
Benezet drove a political and rhetorical wedge between antislavery 
Quakers and the American population as a whole. This paper, then, 
probes the limits and boundaries of Quaker antislavery argumentation 
by, perhaps, the most dedicated abolitionist of the century. I do not 
want to second-guess Benezet, I want to show the consequential 
relationship between theology and antislavery advocacy. Dickinson is 
a helpful conversation partner since he identified with the Quakers, 
but held different theological convictions that, then, translated into a 
different form of political remonstrance. 
I am not aware of any external evidence to suggest that Benezet’s 
1766 antislavery pamphlet was modeled after Dickinson’s 1765 essay. 
However, Dickinson’s standing in the Pennsylvania Quaker community, 
Benezet’s knowledge of current events, and the wide publication of 
Dickinson’s essay in periodicals, such as the Pennsylvania Gazette, lead 
me to believe that he would have been intimately familiar with the 
arguments in the address if not the text of the address itself. The 
striking internal similarities between the two documents suggest that 
Benezet viewed the transatlantic political discourse after the Stamp 
Act as a potential opening for antislavery argumentation. 
In The Late Regulations, Dickinson wrote what may be described as 
an open letter to a friend in London, which was printed on both sides 
of the Atlantic.10 The letter was certainly intended to sway audiences 
in the colonies and in Britain. Dickinson described the suffering of 
colonists caused by British taxation policies in affective language.11
What man who wishes the welfare of America, can view without 
pity, without passion, her restricted and almost stagnated trade, 
with its numerous train of evils—taxes torn from her without 
her consent—Her legislative assemblies, the principal pillars 
of her liberty, crushed into insignificance—A formidable force 
established in the midst of peace, to bleed her into obedience—
The sacred right of trial by jury, violated by the erection of 
arbitrary and unconstitutional jurisdictions—and general 
poverty, discontent and despondence stretching themselves over 
this unoffending country?... YET still their resentment is but 
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the resentment of dutiful children, who have received unmerited 
blows from a beloved parent. Their obedience to Great-Britain 
is secured by the best and strongest ties, those of affection.12
Dickinson’s appeal carries the trademark images and diction of 
the rhetoric of sentimentalism, a literary movement that viewed 
cultivated individuals as beings of moral feeling. Sentimentalism was 
a rhetorical strategy in the second half of the eighteenth century that 
emphasized the promotion of human happiness and morality through 
attention to one’s feelings.13 Invoking “Pity,” “passion,” “bleedings,” 
“tenderness,” “hearts glowing,” “sentiments of duty and affection,” 
and the unrequited love of a calloused parent punishing a sensitive and 
innocent child, Dickinson is appealing to his readers’ emotions.14 He 
used sentimentalism to make a powerful case for colonial American 
innocence in light of British aggression. The theme of innocence 
would play an important role in Patriot propaganda.
But it wasn’t only the Patriot propagandists who wished to interpret 
and fashion political events for their audiences. Benezet also desired 
to influence British political and legal structures through a public 
antislavery campaign. Not only did Benezet innovate and expand on 
the Quaker antislavery tradition by combining biblical arguments, 
philosophical arguments of natural rights, and travelers’ accounts of 
African industriousness in his antislavery essays,15 he also employed a 
subdued sentimentalism in his political writing.16 Like Dickinson and 
the Revolutionary propagandists, Benezet desired to sway popular 
opinion with the language of the “moral marketplace.”17 His attempt 
to appropriate the methods of public discourse for antislavery purposes 
marks an important politically-engaged turn for Quaker antislavery 
activists in the late eighteenth century. However, the impressive list 
of antislavery arguments Benezet employed overlooks the potentially 
effective arguments he would not use, or could not use, without 
threatening his view of faithful Quaker identity.
Benezet’s A Caution and Warning was intended to be read by 
power holders in Britain. In 1767, London Yearly Meeting reprinted 
1500 copies of A Caution and Warning and gave them to each 
member of Parliament, and then, in 1770, sent copies to over 100 
merchant houses in London.18 Written the year after the Stamp Act, 
the pamphlet notes the irony of the popular concern for “Liberty,” 
while Britain and her colonies sustained the practice of slavery. Benezet 
mocked so-called “Advocates of Liberty, [who] remain insensible 
and inattentive to the treatment of thousands and tens of thousands 
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of our fellow-men.”19 While Quaker abolitionists disparaged the 
inconsistency between the Republican ideals of natural rights and 
liberties, on one hand, and slavery, on the other, Quakers and Patriots 
maintained different views of liberty. 
Quaker abolitionists like Benezet and Quaker politicians 
like Dickinson held to a theistic understanding of liberty that 
originated in seventeenth century Quaker theology and informed 
the Quaker antislavery tradition. Liberty of conscience was granted 
to every individual by God.20 It transcended the state and entailed a 
fundamental spiritual equality before God. The capacity to obey, with 
one’s physical body, the message revealed by God, in one’s conscience, 
required a certain amount of social and political freedom. By contrast, 
the Patriots held to a secular view of liberty that was defined within 
and against the state. Moreover, the Patrtiots conceived of human 
rights and liberties only as belonging generally to white, propertied, 
Protestant men, but not given specifically to each individual human 
being. In some cases, Patriots believed, rights and liberties could be 
withheld from some groups and individuals if full liberty would cause 
a threat to the general liberty of the community.21 Dickinson probably 
shared the Quaker understanding of liberty with Benezet, but most 
Patriots adhered to the latter view. For them, granting liberty to 
African Americans would lead to social chaos and endanger the general 
liberty of the community.22 These conflicting understandings of liberty 
explain, in part, why the consistent Quaker recourse to arguments 
from a theological understanding of liberty were often ignored.
The purpose of Benezet’s pamphlet was to prod British rulers in 
London to intervene in the slave trade, ending it before God visited 
the British with justice. However, in Benezet’s estimation, not all 
Britons were equal parties to this injustice. He laid most of the blame 
and cruelties at the feet of American colonists who he thought were 
the primary perpetrators. Whereas the American colonists are argued 
to be the chief offenders, the British government and wealthy British 
merchants were merely guilty of “countenancing” the slave trade.23 
The colonial slave owners are described as “brutal,”24 and violently 
oppressive, while the British are guilty of passively allowing the trade 
to continue. 
Even the passive guilt of Parliament would bring God’s judgment, 
though. In language typical of the sentimentalism of the day, Benezet 
described the suffering of Africans as increasing a burden of national 
guilt that laid heavy on Britain:
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and the groans, the dying groans, which daily ascend to God, 
the common Father of mankind, from the broken hearts of 
those his deeply oppressed creatures; otherwise the powers of 
the earth would not, I think I may venture to say, could not, 
have so long authorised a practice so inconsistent with every 
idea of liberty and justice.25
Typical of Benezet’s essays, he quotes from many different sources 
to make his antislavery appeal. He quotes selectively from sailors and 
Catholic missionaries to paint Africa as an idyllic land before it was 
despoiled by Europeans. He quoted from moralists and religious 
leaders like the Anglican preacher George Whitefield to describe the 
cruelties he witnessed in his travels in the colonies,26 and he quoted 
extensively from enlightenment thinkers to show the inconsistency of 
slavery with the concept of liberty.27
Benezet’s plea is powerful, interspersing his own analysis with 
extended quotes from others. Benezet described the reports of 
slavery he presented as “detestable and shocking,” especially for those 
“whose hearts are not yet hardened by the practice of that cruelty.” 
Again, Benezet is tapping into the stream of sentimental rhetoric, 
which elevated the emotions as interpreters of virtue and morality. It 
was believed that what separated humans from the “brute creatures” 
was the capacity to have moral feelings and sentiment. To lose the 
moral capacity of emotion called into question one’s humanity. This 
depravation of human sentiment was, in fact, the only way Benezet 
could explain the cruelty of slave masters in the West Indies and 
American colonies: “Must not even the common feelings of human 
nature have suffered some grievous change in those men, to be 
capable of such horrid cruelty, towards their fellow men?”28 There 
was a warning in here, too. Those who participated in slavery were in 
danger of losing their humanity and becoming insensible creatures.
Several themes in Benezet’s tract are important for understanding 
its relation to the political petitioning of his day. First, Benezet’s 
depictions of “cruelties,” “suffering,” “feeling,” “groans, the dying 
groans,” and “pity” of the “miserable Negroes” place this argument 
within the stream of sentimental rhetoric.29 Benezet appealed to 
the head and the heart, to the basic humanity of the power holders 
who could use their influence to dissolve slavery. Not only was the 
rhetoric of sentimentalism fashionable in literary circles, and held 
currency among upper class Britons, it also coupled very well with the 
familiar antislavery argument of the Golden Rule. Quaker antislavery 
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advocates had utilized the Golden Rule since the time of George 
Fox.30 Benezet’s sentimental language vividly took the reader into the 
experience of the slave so that they could not only imagine what it 
would be like to do unto others as one would be done by, but to feel 
what they felt.31 
A second theme in Benezet’s essay is that of sin, guilt, and judgment. 
Benezet reminds Parliamentarians, “must we not tremble to think 
what a load of guilt lies upon our Nation generally and individually, so 
far as we in any degree abet or countenance this aggravated iniquity.”32 
Benezet returned again and again to the language of iniquity, guilt, 
and trembling in the face of divine wrath, not only as individual sins 
but as cumulative offenses accruing to the nation as a whole. This 
“judicial providentialism” contended that national crimes brought 
national punishments.33 The sin of slavery committed by colonists 
would bring God’s wrath on the whole nation if left unchecked, 
including the Mother country, so it was up to Britain to stop it or pay 
the consequences.
Like Dickinson, Benezet used sentimental language to emphasize 
his point. Like Dickinson, Benezet called upon republican theories of 
liberty to support his cause, even if they had different understandings 
of liberty from the philosophers they quoted. Like Dickinson, Benezet 
had at least some hope that his argument could influence both colonists 
and British lawmakers. Where Dickinson chided Parliament for taxing 
colonists without their consent, Benezet criticized slaveholders for 
ruling over their slaves without consent. Where Dickinson confronted 
the loss of the “sacred right of trial by jury,” Benezet rejected the 
enslavement of Africans for term of life without due process.34 Both 
Benezet’s antislavery remonstrance and Dickinson’s political suasion 
entered a thought-world that was primed to consider liberty as an 
abstract and secular concept, as well as to employ sentimental rhetoric 
as an important avenue of moral formation.
Despite these similarities in tone and vocabulary, the two tracts are 
different in their assignment of guilt and innocence, and that difference 
explains in part why antislavery, despite the obvious connection 
to liberty, did not become a central tenet of the Revolutionary 
movement. Dickinson’s sentimentalism was intended to establish 
the “unoffending” innocence of the colonists in the face of British 
oppression. By contrast, Benezet’s sentimentalism emphasized the 
innocence of the Africans in the face of colonial guilt, which would 
bring divine judgment as far away from southern plantations as the 
Houses of Parliament.35 
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Benezet was right that the Stamp Act and the pre-revolutionary 
rhetorical and intellectual environment provided an opportunity for 
antislavery thought as a popular cause, but he was wrong to think 
that colonial sin, rather than purity, could undergird American 
antislavery logic. Dickinson’s letter skillfully argued, and brazenly 
embellished, the theme of colonial innocence. Innocence in the face 
of a much larger aggressor characterized the political writings of the 
Patriots and supported an ideology of colonial purity.36 By contrast, 
Patricia Bradley has shown that antislavery proponents, especially 
Quakers, and particularly Benezet, often employed an “America as a 
guilty party” trope that emphasized the brutality and corruption of 
American colonists. Benezet’s pamphlet ignored the British origins 
of slavery and its continuing complicity in slavery in America and 
beyond. Whereas Dickinson’s sentimental rhetoric was intended to 
establish colonial innocence and increase British guilt, Benezet’s 
sentimentalism was intended to increase colonial guilt and encourage 
the British to expunge the contagion.37 
Moreover, in appealing to London politicians to stop colonial 
atrocities, at the very moment that anti-British sentiments were 
growing in the colonies, Benezet triangulated antislavery Quakers 
and London against the colonies.38 It was an effective strategy for 
establishing a transnational antislavery Quaker identity, but it drove 
a wedge between American antislavery Quakers and their fellow 
colonists, the very people they most needed to persuade. Colonial 
American Quaker abolitionists had been deferring and appealing to 
London Yearly Meeting for almost a century by the time of Benezet’s 
essay. This consistent recourse to London and British abolitionists, 
coupled with Quaker anti-war stances and a declared neutrality in the 
conflict between the colonies and Britain, caused many colonists to 
confuse Quakers for Tories.39 Colonial Quakers were seen as standing 
against American virtue and liberty, a stance that contributed to their 
loss of public importance and tainted the antislavery cause.40 
Quaker abolitionists like Benezet could not rally around a 
nationalist agenda, because they had cultivated a transnational Quaker 
identity as a “Holy Nation” united in Spirit and behavior but set apart 
from and opposed to the world’s people.41 During the Revolution 
and its immediate aftermath, Quakers had to distance themselves 
from antislavery efforts, especially outside of Pennsylvania, because 
their misunderstood association with Tories had become toxic to the 
effort.42 This distancing was temporary, but the version of antislavery 
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discourse that would emerge in post-Revolutionary America combined 
many of the Quaker arguments of the eighteenth century with the 
power of persuasion practiced by the Patriots.43
This analysis of Dickinson’s and Benezet’s political petitioning 
demonstrates that Benezet attempted to coopt the language of 
revolutionary propagandists and attempted to weave antislavery 
advocacy into current events. The Quaker theological tradition had 
played an important role in developing arguments against slavery across 
the eighteenth century, but Quaker transnationalism, it’s deference to 
London, and an emphasis on sin and guilt almost guaranteed that 
antislavery would not be taken seriously in Revolutionary America. 
What was persuasive internally to Quakers would need significant 
adjustment before it could extend beyond them. Of all the antislavery 
Quakers associated with the Reformation of American Quakerism, 
Benezet unleashed the broadest and most sophisticated campaign to 
end slavery. However, even here, perhaps his success would have been 
greater if he had shown Dickinson’s willingness to abandon a narrow 
understanding of Quaker faith and identity and proved himself willing 
to become a bad Quaker, that is, to secularize the Quaker values that 
led to an antislavery critique, to ride the wave of American nationalism 
that united the colonies, and so, to triangulate the cause of the enslaved 
and colonists against the British. Of course, Benezet could have made 
all of these compromises and still run against the racialization of 
African slavery by White Americans. To compromise his faith and still 
fail in his antislavery concern would have been a devastating blow, but 
this comparison with Dickinson reveals additional strategic pathways 
for antislavery advocacy in the era of the Revolution.
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